

## Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP, UR, US (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MOSCOW VISIT ANNOUNCED

1. SECRETARY'S MOSCOW VISIT JANUARY 20-23 WAS ANNOUNCED  
IN MOSCOW AND IN WASHINGTON JANUARY 14.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AT  
JANUARY 14 PRESS CONFERENCE:

QUOTE THE UNITED STATES HOLDS THE VIEW THAT THE ESSENCE  
OF THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, IF IT IS TO  
PROCEED TOWARDS A GENUINE EASING OF TENSIONS, IS THAT  
NEITHER SIDE WILL SEEK TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE  
VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER, THAT RESTRAINT WILL GOVERN OUR  
RESPECTIVE POLICIES, AND THAT NOTHING WILL BE DONE THAT  
COULD ESCALATE TENSE SITUATIONS INTO CONFRONTATION BETWEEN  
OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

IT IS THE UNITED STATES VIEW THAT THESE PRINCIPLES OF  
MUTUAL RELATIONS ARE NOT SIMPLY A MATTER OF ABSTRACT  
GOOD WILL. THEY ARE AT THE VERY HEART OF HOW TWO RESPON-  
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SIBLE GREAT POWERS MUST CONDUCT THEIR RELATIONS IN THE

NUCLEAR ERA.

IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT WHEN ONE GREAT POWER ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN A SPECIAL POSITION OF INFLUENCE BASED ON MILITARY INTERVENTION AND IRRESPECTIVE OF ORIGINAL MOTIVES, THE OTHER POWER WILL SOONER OR LATER ACT TO OFFSET THIS ADVANTAGE. BUT THIS WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO A CHAIN OF ACTION AND REACTION TYPICAL OF OTHER HISTORIC ERAS IN WHICH GREAT POWERS MANEUVERED FOR ADVANTAGE, ONLY TO FIND THEMSELVES SOONER OR LATER EMBROILED IN MAJOR CRISES AND INDEED IN OPEN CONFLICT.

IT IS PRECISELY THIS PATTERN THAT MUST BE BROKEN IF A LASTING EASING OF TENSIONS IS TO BE ACHIEVED.

WHATEVER JUSTIFICATION IN REAL OR ALLEGED REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE THE SOVIET UNION MAY CONSIDER TO HAVE HAD IN INTERVENING AND IN ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE TOTALLY UNWARRANTED CUBAN INTRODUCTION OF AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE INTO ANGOLA, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THERE HAS NEVER BEEN ANY HISTORIC SOVIET OR RUSSIAN INTEREST IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD. IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT PRINCIPLES OF RESTRAINT FOR ITSELF THAT IT CONSIDERS THE SOVIET MOVE IN ANGOLA AS RUNNING COUNTER TO THE CRUCIAL PRINCIPLES OF AVOIDANCE OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AND SCRUPULOUS CONCERN FOR THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS WHICH WE HAVE JOINTLY ENUNCIATED.

THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS SUCH ACTIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH A GENUINE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A WHOLLY UNNECESSARY SETBACK TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRENDS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS WHICH WE CANNOT BELIEVE IS ULTIMATELY IN THE SOVIET OR THE WORLD INTEREST.

THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER, IN THE LIGHT OF ANGOLA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, IT IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY TO GO TO MOSCOW AND TO NEGOTIATE ON SALT. THERE ARE TWO POINTS THAT NEED TO BE MADE IN THIS CONTEXT.

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FIRST, WE HAVE NEVER CONSIDERED THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS AS A FAVOR WE GRANT TO THE SOVIET UNION, TO BE TURNED ON AND OFF ACCORDING TO THE EBB AND FLOW OF OUR RELATIONS. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CONTINUATION OF AN UNRESTRAINED STRATEGIC ARMS RACE WILL LEAD TO NEITHER A STRATEGIC NOR A POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. IF THIS RACE CONTINUES, IT WILL HAVE PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE

WELL-BEING OF ALL OF HUMANITY.

LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS IS THEREFORE A PERMANENT AND GLOBAL PROBLEM THAT CANNOT BE SUBORDINATED TO THE DAY-TO-DAY CHANGES IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

AT THE SAME TIME, IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD ON BOTH SIDES THAT IF TENSIONS INCREASE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, THE GENERAL RELATIONSHIP WILL DETERIORATE, AND THEREFORE THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS WILL ALSO BE AFFECTED.

SECOND, WE MUST CONSIDER THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. IF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT LAPSES, THE SOVIETS WILL BE FREE OF SEVERAL SEVERE RESTRAINTS. THEY CAN ADD HEAVY ICBMS WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS. THEY CAN BUILD MORE SUBMARINES WITHOUT DISMANTLING OLD ICBMS. THERE WILL BE NO EQUAL CEILING OF 2,400. THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT WOULD BE THAT THE NUMERICAL GAP FROZEN IN SALT I, AND EQUALIZED IN VLADIVOSTOK, WOULD AGAIN BECOME A FACTOR, FACING US WITH THE CHOICE OF EITHER LARGE EXPENDITURES IN A STRATEGICALLY AND POLITICALLY UNPRODUCTIVE AREA OR A PERCEIVED INEQUALITY WITH ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS.

OF COURSE WE WILL NOT NEGOTIATE ANY AGREEMENT THAT DOES NOT ACHIEVE STRATEGIC EQUALITY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THAT WE CANNOT DEFEND AS BEING IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. NOR DOES IT MEAN THAT ANGOLA, OR SIMILAR SITUATIONS, WILL, IF CONTINUED NOT IMPINGE ON SALT AS WELL AS THE GENERAL RELATIONSHIP. BUT IT DOES MEAN THAT THE GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF A MORE ORDERLY AND STABLE NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WORLD, AND CANNOT

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BE EASILY ABANDONED. THAT IS WHY THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT I SHOULD GO TO MOSCOW TO NEGOTIATE ON SALT, AND WE EXPECT THAT THE TALKS WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THE SAME SPIRIT BY THE SOVIET SIDE. UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

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